// Copyright 2013 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. /** * @fileoverview Type-safe wrappers for unsafe DOM APIs. * * This file provides type-safe wrappers for DOM APIs that can result in * cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, if the API is supplied with * untrusted (attacker-controlled) input. Instead of plain strings, the type * safe wrappers consume values of types from the goog.html package whose * contract promises that values are safe to use in the corresponding context. * * Hence, a program that exclusively uses the wrappers in this file (i.e., whose * only reference to security-sensitive raw DOM APIs are in this file) is * guaranteed to be free of XSS due to incorrect use of such DOM APIs (modulo * correctness of code that produces values of the respective goog.html types, * and absent code that violates type safety). * * For example, assigning to an element's .innerHTML property a string that is * derived (even partially) from untrusted input typically results in an XSS * vulnerability. The type-safe wrapper goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml consumes a * value of type goog.html.SafeHtml, whose contract states that using its values * in a HTML context will not result in XSS. Hence a program that is free of * direct assignments to any element's innerHTML property (with the exception of * the assignment to .innerHTML in this file) is guaranteed to be free of XSS * due to assignment of untrusted strings to the innerHTML property. */ goog.provide('goog.dom.safe'); goog.provide('goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition'); goog.require('goog.asserts'); goog.require('goog.dom.asserts'); goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml'); goog.require('goog.html.SafeScript'); goog.require('goog.html.SafeStyle'); goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl'); goog.require('goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl'); goog.require('goog.string'); goog.require('goog.string.Const'); /** @enum {string} */ goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition = { AFTERBEGIN: 'afterbegin', AFTEREND: 'afterend', BEFOREBEGIN: 'beforebegin', BEFOREEND: 'beforeend' }; /** * Inserts known-safe HTML into a Node, at the specified position. * @param {!Node} node The node on which to call insertAdjacentHTML. * @param {!goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition} position Position where * to insert the HTML. * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to insert. */ goog.dom.safe.insertAdjacentHtml = function(node, position, html) { node.insertAdjacentHTML(position, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html)); }; /** * Tags not allowed in goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml. * @private @const {!Object} */ goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_ = { 'MATH': true, 'SCRIPT': true, 'STYLE': true, 'SVG': true, 'TEMPLATE': true }; /** * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's innerHTML property. * @param {!Element} elem The element whose innerHTML is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. * @throws {Error} If called with one of these tags: math, script, style, svg, * template. */ goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml = function(elem, html) { if (goog.asserts.ENABLE_ASSERTS) { var tagName = elem.tagName.toUpperCase(); if (goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_[tagName]) { throw Error( 'goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml cannot be used to set content of ' + elem.tagName + '.'); } } elem.innerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); }; /** * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's outerHTML property. * @param {!Element} elem The element whose outerHTML is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setOuterHtml = function(elem, html) { elem.outerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); }; /** * Sets the given element's style property to the contents of the provided * SafeStyle object. * @param {!Element} elem * @param {!goog.html.SafeStyle} style */ goog.dom.safe.setStyle = function(elem, style) { elem.style.cssText = goog.html.SafeStyle.unwrap(style); }; /** * Writes known-safe HTML to a document. * @param {!Document} doc The document to be written to. * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.documentWrite = function(doc, html) { doc.write(goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html)); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to an anchor element's href property. * * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to * anchor's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref(anchorEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * anchorEl.href = url; * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if url is a * user-/attacker-controlled value. * * @param {!HTMLAnchorElement} anchor The anchor element whose href property * is to be assigned to. * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize */ goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref = function(anchor, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLAnchorElement(anchor); /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ var safeUrl; if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { safeUrl = url; } else { safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); } anchor.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to an image element's src property. * * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to * image's src property. If url is of type string however, it is first * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. * * @param {!HTMLImageElement} imageElement The image element whose src property * is to be assigned to. * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize */ goog.dom.safe.setImageSrc = function(imageElement, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLImageElement(imageElement); /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ var safeUrl; if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { safeUrl = url; } else { safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); } imageElement.src = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to an embed element's src property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc(embedEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * embedEl.src = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLEmbedElement} embed The embed element whose src property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc = function(embed, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLEmbedElement(embed); embed.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to a frame element's src property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc(frameEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * frameEl.src = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLFrameElement} frame The frame element whose src property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc = function(frame, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLFrameElement(frame); frame.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc(iframeEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * iframeEl.src = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose src property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc = function(iframe, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe); iframe.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); }; /** * Safely assigns HTML to an iframe element's srcdoc property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc(iframeEl, safeHtml); * which is a safe alternative to * iframeEl.srcdoc = html; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code. * * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose srcdoc property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The HTML to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc = function(iframe, html) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe); iframe.srcdoc = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); }; /** * Safely sets a link element's href and rel properties. Whether or not * the URL assigned to href has to be a goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl * depends on the value of the rel property. If rel contains "stylesheet" * then a TrustedResourceUrl is required. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel(linkEl, url, 'stylesheet'); * which is a safe alternative to * linkEl.rel = 'stylesheet'; * linkEl.href = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLLinkElement} link The link element whose href property * is to be assigned to. * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl|!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL * to assign to the href property. Must be a TrustedResourceUrl if the * value assigned to rel contains "stylesheet". A string value is * sanitized with goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. * @param {string} rel The value to assign to the rel property. * @throws {Error} if rel contains "stylesheet" and url is not a * TrustedResourceUrl * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize */ goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel = function(link, url, rel) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLLinkElement(link); link.rel = rel; if (goog.string.caseInsensitiveContains(rel, 'stylesheet')) { goog.asserts.assert( url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl, 'URL must be TrustedResourceUrl because "rel" contains "stylesheet"'); link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); } else if (url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl) { link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); } else if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(url); } else { // string // SafeUrl.sanitize must return legitimate SafeUrl when passed a string. link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url).getTypedStringValue(); } }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to an object element's data property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setObjectData(objectEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * objectEl.data = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless setit is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLObjectElement} object The object element whose data property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setObjectData = function(object, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLObjectElement(object); object.data = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to a script element's src property. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc(scriptEl, url); * which is a safe alternative to * scriptEl.src = url; * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose src property * is to be assigned to. * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc = function(script, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script); script.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); }; /** * Safely assigns a value to a script element's content. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent(scriptEl, content); * which is a safe alternative to * scriptEl.text = content; * The latter can result in executing untrusted code unless it is ensured that * the code is loaded from a trustworthy resource. * * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose content is being * set. * @param {!goog.html.SafeScript} content The content to assign. */ goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent = function(script, content) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script); script.text = goog.html.SafeScript.unwrap(content); }; /** * Safely assigns a URL to a Location object's href property. * * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to * loc's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref(document.location, redirectUrl); * which is a safe alternative to * document.location.href = redirectUrl; * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a * user-/attacker-controlled value. * * @param {!Location} loc The Location object whose href property is to be * assigned to. * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize */ goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref = function(loc, url) { goog.dom.asserts.assertIsLocation(loc); /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ var safeUrl; if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { safeUrl = url; } else { safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); } loc.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); }; /** * Safely opens a URL in a new window (via window.open). * * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and passed in to * window.open. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. * * Note that this function does not prevent leakages via the referer that is * sent by window.open. It is advised to only use this to open 1st party URLs. * * Example usage: * goog.dom.safe.openInWindow(url); * which is a safe alternative to * window.open(url); * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a * user-/attacker-controlled value. * * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to open. * @param {Window=} opt_openerWin Window of which to call the .open() method. * Defaults to the global window. * @param {!goog.string.Const=} opt_name Name of the window to open in. Can be * _top, etc as allowed by window.open(). * @param {string=} opt_specs Comma-separated list of specifications, same as * in window.open(). * @param {boolean=} opt_replace Whether to replace the current entry in browser * history, same as in window.open(). * @return {Window} Window the url was opened in. */ goog.dom.safe.openInWindow = function( url, opt_openerWin, opt_name, opt_specs, opt_replace) { /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ var safeUrl; if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { safeUrl = url; } else { safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); } var win = opt_openerWin || window; return win.open( goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl), // If opt_name is undefined, simply passing that in to open() causes IE to // reuse the current window instead of opening a new one. Thus we pass '' // in instead, which according to spec opens a new window. See // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-open . opt_name ? goog.string.Const.unwrap(opt_name) : '', opt_specs, opt_replace); };