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Diffstat (limited to 'static/src/assets/viz/2/goog/dom/safe.js')
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diff --git a/static/src/assets/viz/2/goog/dom/safe.js b/static/src/assets/viz/2/goog/dom/safe.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9390a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/src/assets/viz/2/goog/dom/safe.js @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +/** + * @fileoverview Type-safe wrappers for unsafe DOM APIs. + * + * This file provides type-safe wrappers for DOM APIs that can result in + * cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, if the API is supplied with + * untrusted (attacker-controlled) input. Instead of plain strings, the type + * safe wrappers consume values of types from the goog.html package whose + * contract promises that values are safe to use in the corresponding context. + * + * Hence, a program that exclusively uses the wrappers in this file (i.e., whose + * only reference to security-sensitive raw DOM APIs are in this file) is + * guaranteed to be free of XSS due to incorrect use of such DOM APIs (modulo + * correctness of code that produces values of the respective goog.html types, + * and absent code that violates type safety). + * + * For example, assigning to an element's .innerHTML property a string that is + * derived (even partially) from untrusted input typically results in an XSS + * vulnerability. The type-safe wrapper goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml consumes a + * value of type goog.html.SafeHtml, whose contract states that using its values + * in a HTML context will not result in XSS. Hence a program that is free of + * direct assignments to any element's innerHTML property (with the exception of + * the assignment to .innerHTML in this file) is guaranteed to be free of XSS + * due to assignment of untrusted strings to the innerHTML property. + */ + +goog.provide('goog.dom.safe'); +goog.provide('goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition'); + +goog.require('goog.asserts'); +goog.require('goog.dom.asserts'); +goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml'); +goog.require('goog.html.SafeScript'); +goog.require('goog.html.SafeStyle'); +goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl'); +goog.require('goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl'); +goog.require('goog.string'); +goog.require('goog.string.Const'); + + +/** @enum {string} */ +goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition = { + AFTERBEGIN: 'afterbegin', + AFTEREND: 'afterend', + BEFOREBEGIN: 'beforebegin', + BEFOREEND: 'beforeend' +}; + + +/** + * Inserts known-safe HTML into a Node, at the specified position. + * @param {!Node} node The node on which to call insertAdjacentHTML. + * @param {!goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition} position Position where + * to insert the HTML. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to insert. + */ +goog.dom.safe.insertAdjacentHtml = function(node, position, html) { + node.insertAdjacentHTML(position, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html)); +}; + + +/** + * Tags not allowed in goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml. + * @private @const {!Object<string, boolean>} + */ +goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_ = { + 'MATH': true, + 'SCRIPT': true, + 'STYLE': true, + 'SVG': true, + 'TEMPLATE': true +}; + + +/** + * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's innerHTML property. + * @param {!Element} elem The element whose innerHTML is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. + * @throws {Error} If called with one of these tags: math, script, style, svg, + * template. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml = function(elem, html) { + if (goog.asserts.ENABLE_ASSERTS) { + var tagName = elem.tagName.toUpperCase(); + if (goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_[tagName]) { + throw Error( + 'goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml cannot be used to set content of ' + + elem.tagName + '.'); + } + } + elem.innerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); +}; + + +/** + * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's outerHTML property. + * @param {!Element} elem The element whose outerHTML is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setOuterHtml = function(elem, html) { + elem.outerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); +}; + + +/** + * Sets the given element's style property to the contents of the provided + * SafeStyle object. + * @param {!Element} elem + * @param {!goog.html.SafeStyle} style + */ +goog.dom.safe.setStyle = function(elem, style) { + elem.style.cssText = goog.html.SafeStyle.unwrap(style); +}; + + +/** + * Writes known-safe HTML to a document. + * @param {!Document} doc The document to be written to. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.documentWrite = function(doc, html) { + doc.write(goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html)); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to an anchor element's href property. + * + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to + * anchor's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first + * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref(anchorEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * anchorEl.href = url; + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if url is a + * user-/attacker-controlled value. + * + * @param {!HTMLAnchorElement} anchor The anchor element whose href property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize + */ +goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref = function(anchor, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLAnchorElement(anchor); + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ + var safeUrl; + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { + safeUrl = url; + } else { + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); + } + anchor.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to an image element's src property. + * + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to + * image's src property. If url is of type string however, it is first + * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. + * + * @param {!HTMLImageElement} imageElement The image element whose src property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize + */ +goog.dom.safe.setImageSrc = function(imageElement, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLImageElement(imageElement); + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ + var safeUrl; + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { + safeUrl = url; + } else { + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); + } + imageElement.src = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to an embed element's src property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc(embedEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * embedEl.src = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLEmbedElement} embed The embed element whose src property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc = function(embed, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLEmbedElement(embed); + embed.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to a frame element's src property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc(frameEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * frameEl.src = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLFrameElement} frame The frame element whose src property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc = function(frame, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLFrameElement(frame); + frame.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc(iframeEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * iframeEl.src = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose src property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc = function(iframe, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe); + iframe.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns HTML to an iframe element's srcdoc property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc(iframeEl, safeHtml); + * which is a safe alternative to + * iframeEl.srcdoc = html; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code. + * + * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose srcdoc property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The HTML to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc = function(iframe, html) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe); + iframe.srcdoc = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html); +}; + + +/** + * Safely sets a link element's href and rel properties. Whether or not + * the URL assigned to href has to be a goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl + * depends on the value of the rel property. If rel contains "stylesheet" + * then a TrustedResourceUrl is required. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel(linkEl, url, 'stylesheet'); + * which is a safe alternative to + * linkEl.rel = 'stylesheet'; + * linkEl.href = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLLinkElement} link The link element whose href property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl|!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL + * to assign to the href property. Must be a TrustedResourceUrl if the + * value assigned to rel contains "stylesheet". A string value is + * sanitized with goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. + * @param {string} rel The value to assign to the rel property. + * @throws {Error} if rel contains "stylesheet" and url is not a + * TrustedResourceUrl + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize + */ +goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel = function(link, url, rel) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLLinkElement(link); + link.rel = rel; + if (goog.string.caseInsensitiveContains(rel, 'stylesheet')) { + goog.asserts.assert( + url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl, + 'URL must be TrustedResourceUrl because "rel" contains "stylesheet"'); + link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); + } else if (url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl) { + link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); + } else if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { + link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(url); + } else { // string + // SafeUrl.sanitize must return legitimate SafeUrl when passed a string. + link.href = + goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url).getTypedStringValue(); + } +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to an object element's data property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setObjectData(objectEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * objectEl.data = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless setit is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLObjectElement} object The object element whose data property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setObjectData = function(object, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLObjectElement(object); + object.data = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to a script element's src property. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc(scriptEl, url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * scriptEl.src = url; + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose src property + * is to be assigned to. + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc = function(script, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script); + script.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a value to a script element's content. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent(scriptEl, content); + * which is a safe alternative to + * scriptEl.text = content; + * The latter can result in executing untrusted code unless it is ensured that + * the code is loaded from a trustworthy resource. + * + * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose content is being + * set. + * @param {!goog.html.SafeScript} content The content to assign. + */ +goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent = function(script, content) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script); + script.text = goog.html.SafeScript.unwrap(content); +}; + + +/** + * Safely assigns a URL to a Location object's href property. + * + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to + * loc's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized + * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref(document.location, redirectUrl); + * which is a safe alternative to + * document.location.href = redirectUrl; + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a + * user-/attacker-controlled value. + * + * @param {!Location} loc The Location object whose href property is to be + * assigned to. + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign. + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize + */ +goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref = function(loc, url) { + goog.dom.asserts.assertIsLocation(loc); + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ + var safeUrl; + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { + safeUrl = url; + } else { + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); + } + loc.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl); +}; + + +/** + * Safely opens a URL in a new window (via window.open). + * + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and passed in to + * window.open. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized + * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize. + * + * Note that this function does not prevent leakages via the referer that is + * sent by window.open. It is advised to only use this to open 1st party URLs. + * + * Example usage: + * goog.dom.safe.openInWindow(url); + * which is a safe alternative to + * window.open(url); + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a + * user-/attacker-controlled value. + * + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to open. + * @param {Window=} opt_openerWin Window of which to call the .open() method. + * Defaults to the global window. + * @param {!goog.string.Const=} opt_name Name of the window to open in. Can be + * _top, etc as allowed by window.open(). + * @param {string=} opt_specs Comma-separated list of specifications, same as + * in window.open(). + * @param {boolean=} opt_replace Whether to replace the current entry in browser + * history, same as in window.open(). + * @return {Window} Window the url was opened in. + */ +goog.dom.safe.openInWindow = function( + url, opt_openerWin, opt_name, opt_specs, opt_replace) { + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */ + var safeUrl; + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) { + safeUrl = url; + } else { + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url); + } + var win = opt_openerWin || window; + return win.open( + goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl), + // If opt_name is undefined, simply passing that in to open() causes IE to + // reuse the current window instead of opening a new one. Thus we pass '' + // in instead, which according to spec opens a new window. See + // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-open . + opt_name ? goog.string.Const.unwrap(opt_name) : '', opt_specs, + opt_replace); +}; |