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authorBrian Picciano <mediocregopher@gmail.com>2021-07-31 11:35:39 -0600
committerBrian Picciano <mediocregopher@gmail.com>2021-07-31 11:35:39 -0600
commitf1998c321a4eec6d75b58d84aa8610971bf21979 (patch)
treea90783eb296cc50e1c48433f241624f26b99be27 /src/assets/viz/1/goog/dom/safe.js
parent03a35dcc38b055f15df160bd300969e3b703d4b1 (diff)
move static files into static sub-dir, refactor nix a bit
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-// Copyright 2013 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-/**
- * @fileoverview Type-safe wrappers for unsafe DOM APIs.
- *
- * This file provides type-safe wrappers for DOM APIs that can result in
- * cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, if the API is supplied with
- * untrusted (attacker-controlled) input. Instead of plain strings, the type
- * safe wrappers consume values of types from the goog.html package whose
- * contract promises that values are safe to use in the corresponding context.
- *
- * Hence, a program that exclusively uses the wrappers in this file (i.e., whose
- * only reference to security-sensitive raw DOM APIs are in this file) is
- * guaranteed to be free of XSS due to incorrect use of such DOM APIs (modulo
- * correctness of code that produces values of the respective goog.html types,
- * and absent code that violates type safety).
- *
- * For example, assigning to an element's .innerHTML property a string that is
- * derived (even partially) from untrusted input typically results in an XSS
- * vulnerability. The type-safe wrapper goog.html.setInnerHtml consumes a value
- * of type goog.html.SafeHtml, whose contract states that using its values in a
- * HTML context will not result in XSS. Hence a program that is free of direct
- * assignments to any element's innerHTML property (with the exception of the
- * assignment to .innerHTML in this file) is guaranteed to be free of XSS due to
- * assignment of untrusted strings to the innerHTML property.
- */
-
-goog.provide('goog.dom.safe');
-goog.provide('goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition');
-
-goog.require('goog.asserts');
-goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml');
-goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl');
-goog.require('goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl');
-goog.require('goog.string');
-goog.require('goog.string.Const');
-
-
-/** @enum {string} */
-goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition = {
- AFTERBEGIN: 'afterbegin',
- AFTEREND: 'afterend',
- BEFOREBEGIN: 'beforebegin',
- BEFOREEND: 'beforeend'
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Inserts known-safe HTML into a Node, at the specified position.
- * @param {!Node} node The node on which to call insertAdjacentHTML.
- * @param {!goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition} position Position where
- * to insert the HTML.
- * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to insert.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.insertAdjacentHtml = function(node, position, html) {
- node.insertAdjacentHTML(position, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's innerHTML property.
- * @param {!Element} elem The element whose innerHTML is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml = function(elem, html) {
- elem.innerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's outerHTML property.
- * @param {!Element} elem The element whose outerHTML is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setOuterHtml = function(elem, html) {
- elem.outerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Writes known-safe HTML to a document.
- * @param {!Document} doc The document to be written to.
- * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.documentWrite = function(doc, html) {
- doc.write(goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an anchor element's href property.
- *
- * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
- * anchor's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first
- * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref(anchorEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * anchorEl.href = url;
- * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if url is a
- * user-/attacker-controlled value.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLAnchorElement} anchor The anchor element whose href property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
- * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref = function(anchor, url) {
- /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
- var safeUrl;
- if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
- safeUrl = url;
- } else {
- safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
- }
- anchor.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an image element's src property.
- *
- * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
- * image's src property. If url is of type string however, it is first
- * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLImageElement} imageElement The image element whose src property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
- * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setImageSrc = function(imageElement, url) {
- /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
- var safeUrl;
- if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
- safeUrl = url;
- } else {
- safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
- }
- imageElement.src = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an embed element's src property.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc(embedEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * embedEl.src = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLEmbedElement} embed The embed element whose src property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc = function(embed, url) {
- embed.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to a frame element's src property.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc(frameEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * frameEl.src = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLFrameElement} frame The frame element whose src property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc = function(frame, url) {
- frame.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc(iframeEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * iframeEl.src = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose src property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc = function(iframe, url) {
- iframe.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely sets a link element's href and rel properties. Whether or not
- * the URL assigned to href has to be a goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl
- * depends on the value of the rel property. If rel contains "stylesheet"
- * then a TrustedResourceUrl is required.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel(linkEl, url, 'stylesheet');
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * linkEl.rel = 'stylesheet';
- * linkEl.href = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLLinkElement} link The link element whose href property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl|!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL
- * to assign to the href property. Must be a TrustedResourceUrl if the
- * value assigned to rel contains "stylesheet". A string value is
- * sanitized with goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
- * @param {string} rel The value to assign to the rel property.
- * @throws {Error} if rel contains "stylesheet" and url is not a
- * TrustedResourceUrl
- * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel = function(link, url, rel) {
- link.rel = rel;
- if (goog.string.caseInsensitiveContains(rel, 'stylesheet')) {
- goog.asserts.assert(
- url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl,
- 'URL must be TrustedResourceUrl because "rel" contains "stylesheet"');
- link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
- } else if (url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl) {
- link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
- } else if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
- link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(url);
- } else { // string
- // SafeUrl.sanitize must return legitimate SafeUrl when passed a string.
- link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url).getTypedStringValue();
- }
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an object element's data property.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setObjectData(objectEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * objectEl.data = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless setit is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLObjectElement} object The object element whose data property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setObjectData = function(object, url) {
- object.data = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc(scriptEl, url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * scriptEl.src = url;
- * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
- * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
- *
- * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose src property
- * is to be assigned to.
- * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc = function(script, url) {
- script.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely assigns a URL to a Location object's href property.
- *
- * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
- * loc's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
- * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref(document.location, redirectUrl);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * document.location.href = redirectUrl;
- * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
- * user-/attacker-controlled value.
- *
- * @param {!Location} loc The Location object whose href property is to be
- * assigned to.
- * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
- * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
- */
-goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref = function(loc, url) {
- /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
- var safeUrl;
- if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
- safeUrl = url;
- } else {
- safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
- }
- loc.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
-};
-
-
-/**
- * Safely opens a URL in a new window (via window.open).
- *
- * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and passed in to
- * window.open. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
- * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
- *
- * Note that this function does not prevent leakages via the referer that is
- * sent by window.open. It is advised to only use this to open 1st party URLs.
- *
- * Example usage:
- * goog.dom.safe.openInWindow(url);
- * which is a safe alternative to
- * window.open(url);
- * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
- * user-/attacker-controlled value.
- *
- * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to open.
- * @param {Window=} opt_openerWin Window of which to call the .open() method.
- * Defaults to the global window.
- * @param {!goog.string.Const=} opt_name Name of the window to open in. Can be
- * _top, etc as allowed by window.open().
- * @param {string=} opt_specs Comma-separated list of specifications, same as
- * in window.open().
- * @param {boolean=} opt_replace Whether to replace the current entry in browser
- * history, same as in window.open().
- * @return {Window} Window the url was opened in.
- */
-goog.dom.safe.openInWindow = function(
- url, opt_openerWin, opt_name, opt_specs, opt_replace) {
- /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
- var safeUrl;
- if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
- safeUrl = url;
- } else {
- safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
- }
- var win = opt_openerWin || window;
- return win.open(
- goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl),
- // If opt_name is undefined, simply passing that in to open() causes IE to
- // reuse the current window instead of opening a new one. Thus we pass ''
- // in instead, which according to spec opens a new window. See
- // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-open .
- opt_name ? goog.string.Const.unwrap(opt_name) : '', opt_specs,
- opt_replace);
-};