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+// Copyright 2013 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Type-safe wrappers for unsafe DOM APIs.
+ *
+ * This file provides type-safe wrappers for DOM APIs that can result in
+ * cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, if the API is supplied with
+ * untrusted (attacker-controlled) input.  Instead of plain strings, the type
+ * safe wrappers consume values of types from the goog.html package whose
+ * contract promises that values are safe to use in the corresponding context.
+ *
+ * Hence, a program that exclusively uses the wrappers in this file (i.e., whose
+ * only reference to security-sensitive raw DOM APIs are in this file) is
+ * guaranteed to be free of XSS due to incorrect use of such DOM APIs (modulo
+ * correctness of code that produces values of the respective goog.html types,
+ * and absent code that violates type safety).
+ *
+ * For example, assigning to an element's .innerHTML property a string that is
+ * derived (even partially) from untrusted input typically results in an XSS
+ * vulnerability. The type-safe wrapper goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml consumes a
+ * value of type goog.html.SafeHtml, whose contract states that using its values
+ * in a HTML context will not result in XSS. Hence a program that is free of
+ * direct assignments to any element's innerHTML property (with the exception of
+ * the assignment to .innerHTML in this file) is guaranteed to be free of XSS
+ * due to assignment of untrusted strings to the innerHTML property.
+ */
+
+goog.provide('goog.dom.safe');
+goog.provide('goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition');
+
+goog.require('goog.asserts');
+goog.require('goog.dom.asserts');
+goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml');
+goog.require('goog.html.SafeScript');
+goog.require('goog.html.SafeStyle');
+goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl');
+goog.require('goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl');
+goog.require('goog.string');
+goog.require('goog.string.Const');
+
+
+/** @enum {string} */
+goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition = {
+  AFTERBEGIN: 'afterbegin',
+  AFTEREND: 'afterend',
+  BEFOREBEGIN: 'beforebegin',
+  BEFOREEND: 'beforeend'
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Inserts known-safe HTML into a Node, at the specified position.
+ * @param {!Node} node The node on which to call insertAdjacentHTML.
+ * @param {!goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition} position Position where
+ *     to insert the HTML.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to insert.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.insertAdjacentHtml = function(node, position, html) {
+  node.insertAdjacentHTML(position, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Tags not allowed in goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml.
+ * @private @const {!Object<string, boolean>}
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_ = {
+  'MATH': true,
+  'SCRIPT': true,
+  'STYLE': true,
+  'SVG': true,
+  'TEMPLATE': true
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's innerHTML property.
+ * @param {!Element} elem The element whose innerHTML is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
+ * @throws {Error} If called with one of these tags: math, script, style, svg,
+ *     template.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml = function(elem, html) {
+  if (goog.asserts.ENABLE_ASSERTS) {
+    var tagName = elem.tagName.toUpperCase();
+    if (goog.dom.safe.SET_INNER_HTML_DISALLOWED_TAGS_[tagName]) {
+      throw Error(
+          'goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml cannot be used to set content of ' +
+          elem.tagName + '.');
+    }
+  }
+  elem.innerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's outerHTML property.
+ * @param {!Element} elem The element whose outerHTML is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setOuterHtml = function(elem, html) {
+  elem.outerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Sets the given element's style property to the contents of the provided
+ * SafeStyle object.
+ * @param {!Element} elem
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeStyle} style
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setStyle = function(elem, style) {
+  elem.style.cssText = goog.html.SafeStyle.unwrap(style);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Writes known-safe HTML to a document.
+ * @param {!Document} doc The document to be written to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.documentWrite = function(doc, html) {
+  doc.write(goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to an anchor element's href property.
+ *
+ * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
+ * anchor's href property.  If url is of type string however, it is first
+ * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref(anchorEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   anchorEl.href = url;
+ * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if url is a
+ * user-/attacker-controlled value.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLAnchorElement} anchor The anchor element whose href property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref = function(anchor, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLAnchorElement(anchor);
+  /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
+  var safeUrl;
+  if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
+    safeUrl = url;
+  } else {
+    safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url);
+  }
+  anchor.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to an image element's src property.
+ *
+ * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
+ * image's src property.  If url is of type string however, it is first
+ * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLImageElement} imageElement The image element whose src property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setImageSrc = function(imageElement, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLImageElement(imageElement);
+  /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
+  var safeUrl;
+  if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
+    safeUrl = url;
+  } else {
+    safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url);
+  }
+  imageElement.src = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to an embed element's src property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc(embedEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   embedEl.src = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLEmbedElement} embed The embed element whose src property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc = function(embed, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLEmbedElement(embed);
+  embed.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to a frame element's src property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc(frameEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   frameEl.src = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLFrameElement} frame The frame element whose src property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc = function(frame, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLFrameElement(frame);
+  frame.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc(iframeEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   iframeEl.src = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose src property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc = function(iframe, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe);
+  iframe.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns HTML to an iframe element's srcdoc property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc(iframeEl, safeHtml);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   iframeEl.srcdoc = html;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose srcdoc property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The HTML to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrcdoc = function(iframe, html) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLIFrameElement(iframe);
+  iframe.srcdoc = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely sets a link element's href and rel properties. Whether or not
+ * the URL assigned to href has to be a goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl
+ * depends on the value of the rel property. If rel contains "stylesheet"
+ * then a TrustedResourceUrl is required.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel(linkEl, url, 'stylesheet');
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   linkEl.rel = 'stylesheet';
+ *   linkEl.href = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLLinkElement} link The link element whose href property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl|!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL
+ *     to assign to the href property. Must be a TrustedResourceUrl if the
+ *     value assigned to rel contains "stylesheet". A string value is
+ *     sanitized with goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
+ * @param {string} rel The value to assign to the rel property.
+ * @throws {Error} if rel contains "stylesheet" and url is not a
+ *     TrustedResourceUrl
+ * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel = function(link, url, rel) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLLinkElement(link);
+  link.rel = rel;
+  if (goog.string.caseInsensitiveContains(rel, 'stylesheet')) {
+    goog.asserts.assert(
+        url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl,
+        'URL must be TrustedResourceUrl because "rel" contains "stylesheet"');
+    link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+  } else if (url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl) {
+    link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+  } else if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
+    link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(url);
+  } else {  // string
+    // SafeUrl.sanitize must return legitimate SafeUrl when passed a string.
+    link.href =
+        goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url).getTypedStringValue();
+  }
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to an object element's data property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setObjectData(objectEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   objectEl.data = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless setit is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLObjectElement} object The object element whose data property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setObjectData = function(object, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLObjectElement(object);
+  object.data = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to a script element's src property.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc(scriptEl, url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   scriptEl.src = url;
+ * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose src property
+ *     is to be assigned to.
+ * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc = function(script, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script);
+  script.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a value to a script element's content.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent(scriptEl, content);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   scriptEl.text = content;
+ * The latter can result in executing untrusted code unless it is ensured that
+ * the code is loaded from a trustworthy resource.
+ *
+ * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose content is being
+ *     set.
+ * @param {!goog.html.SafeScript} content The content to assign.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setScriptContent = function(script, content) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsHTMLScriptElement(script);
+  script.text = goog.html.SafeScript.unwrap(content);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely assigns a URL to a Location object's href property.
+ *
+ * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
+ * loc's href property.  If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
+ * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref(document.location, redirectUrl);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   document.location.href = redirectUrl;
+ * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
+ * user-/attacker-controlled value.
+ *
+ * @param {!Location} loc The Location object whose href property is to be
+ *     assigned to.
+ * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
+ * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref = function(loc, url) {
+  goog.dom.asserts.assertIsLocation(loc);
+  /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
+  var safeUrl;
+  if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
+    safeUrl = url;
+  } else {
+    safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url);
+  }
+  loc.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Safely opens a URL in a new window (via window.open).
+ *
+ * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and passed in to
+ * window.open.  If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
+ * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
+ *
+ * Note that this function does not prevent leakages via the referer that is
+ * sent by window.open. It is advised to only use this to open 1st party URLs.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ *   goog.dom.safe.openInWindow(url);
+ * which is a safe alternative to
+ *   window.open(url);
+ * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
+ * user-/attacker-controlled value.
+ *
+ * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to open.
+ * @param {Window=} opt_openerWin Window of which to call the .open() method.
+ *     Defaults to the global window.
+ * @param {!goog.string.Const=} opt_name Name of the window to open in. Can be
+ *     _top, etc as allowed by window.open().
+ * @param {string=} opt_specs Comma-separated list of specifications, same as
+ *     in window.open().
+ * @param {boolean=} opt_replace Whether to replace the current entry in browser
+ *     history, same as in window.open().
+ * @return {Window} Window the url was opened in.
+ */
+goog.dom.safe.openInWindow = function(
+    url, opt_openerWin, opt_name, opt_specs, opt_replace) {
+  /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
+  var safeUrl;
+  if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
+    safeUrl = url;
+  } else {
+    safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitizeAssertUnchanged(url);
+  }
+  var win = opt_openerWin || window;
+  return win.open(
+      goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl),
+      // If opt_name is undefined, simply passing that in to open() causes IE to
+      // reuse the current window instead of opening a new one. Thus we pass ''
+      // in instead, which according to spec opens a new window. See
+      // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-open .
+      opt_name ? goog.string.Const.unwrap(opt_name) : '', opt_specs,
+      opt_replace);
+};